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Argument 
APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS FAIL TO SHOW THAT THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
ORDER WAS PROPERLY BASED ON A MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES AS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW, NOR DO THEY SHOW THAT 
APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS AND OTHER RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED; 
THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
RULING. 
A. Morkel's argument is in error when she claims that Blocker failed to preserve 
the change of circumstances issue on appeal. 
Merkel erroneously argues that Blocker failed to preserve the change of circumstances 
issue on appeal. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24 requires that the appellant must 
provide a showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court. Three elements are required 
for preservation. First, the issue must be raised in a timely fashion. Second, the issue must be 
specifically raised, and third, the party must introduce evidence or legal authority in support of 
the issue. Badger v. Brook!Jn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
Blocker did properly preserve the issue below as he demonstrated in his brief. 1 First, 
the issue must be raised in a timely fashion. Blocker raised the issue of his objection to the 
petition to modify and specifically the lack of specificity in the alleged "material change in 
circumstances" during the June 10, 2015 hearing. (R. 6330 p. 9, lines 8-9.) Although he was 
cut-off by Judge Taylor before he was able to fully make the substance of his objection clear, 
Blocker said, "I would like to express on the record that I strenuously object with that for the 
following .... " It is clear from the context of the statement that "that" in Blocker's statement 
referred to Judge Taylor's statement that he was going to rule that Markel had shown a 
1 Ironically, Morkel's brief even more directly shows the preservation of the issues by directly quoting the 
dialogue between Blocker and Judge Taylor that preserves the issue. See Appellee's Brief pages 21-22. 
1 
material change in circumstances. Second, the issue must be specifically raised. Again, Blocker 
attempted to be specific by telling Judge Taylor that he had "reasons" that he wanted to raise. 
(See R. 6330 p. 9, line 11.) However, he was cut off by Judge Taylor who immediately 
overruled his attempt to speak. Again it is clear from the context that Blocker was attempting 
to specifically raise the issue of Taylor's conclusion that Morkel had shown a material change 
in circumstance. It would be putting form over substance to reject Blocker's appeal for lack of 
preservation at this point simply because Judge Taylor's continuous interruptions of a pro se 
party who felt bullied by a judge prevented Blocker from completing his sentence and thus 
preventing the "specificity" required by Rule 24. Finally, in compliance with the third 
requirement to preserve the issue for review, Blocker next attempted to state the law 
governing the issue: "Okay, may I state the law regarding this?" (R. 6330 p. 9, line 13.) As 
with his previous attempts he was cut off, being told "No, I'm familiar with the law. That's 
my ruling." (R. 6330 p. 9, line 14.) Blocker persisted: "Hogue v. Hogue, you're familiar with 
that?" (R. 6330 p. 9, line 15.) Clearly, by raising the issue in a timely matter, with specificity, 
and with direct citation to governing law, Blocker preserved the issue on appeal. 
B. Morkel's argument that marshaling applies to this appeal is erroneous because 
marshaling only applies to appeals challenging findings of fact. 
Morkel contends that all arguments in the Appellant's brief on the merits should be 
stricken for failure to marshal evidence; however, Morkel is in error because Utah's marshaling 
requirement only applies to appeals challenging findings of fact employing a "clear error" 
standard of review, and Blocker does not challenge factual findings. Nowhere in her argument 
has Morkel either directly or indirectly argued for such a standard of review. Blocker's appeal 
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challenges a conclusion of law: whether Markel sufficiently proved and the court below was 
justified in concluding that she had proved a substantial change in circumstances, which is a 
legal conclusion, not a finding of fact. The standard of review Markel asks this Court to adopt 
is unclear; in some places she seems to be asking the Court to apply an abuse of discretion 
standard while in others she seems to be seeking de novo review, but nowhere does she 
invoke a "clear error" review either directly or indirectly by asking this Court to review factual 
findings rather than conclusions of law. 
Utah's marshaling requirement clearly applies onfy to appeals of findings of fact, subject 
to "clear error review," rather than conclusions of law. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 
UT 42 iP 7, 164 P.3d 3. Appellants contesting such factual findings are required to marshal 
"'all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting and contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence."' Id. (quoting Grace Grilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'm, 776 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
Blocker is not challenging factual findings in this case. The determination of a 
"material change in circumstances" for purposes of a modification of a child custody order is 
a conclusion of law subject to a de novo, or at best, an abuse of discretion, standard of review. 
Nowhere in Utah case law is "clear error" review ever applied to such determinations. Hence, 
Morkel's marshaling argument fails. 
Even if the Court determines that marshaling does apply in this case, it should be 
directed by the Utah Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the marshaling requirement in 
State v. Nielsen wherein the Court held that "from here on our analysis will be focused on the 
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ultimate question of where the appellant has established a basis for overcoming a healtl:!J dose of 
deference owed to factual findings and jury verditts-and not on whether there is a technical dejicienry in 
marshaling meriting a default." State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,I 14, 326 P.3d 645(emphasis added). 
C. Morkel's argument that Judge Taylor's temporary change from supervised to 
unsupervised visitation constitutes a legal "material change in circumstances" 
upon which the trial court can base its ruling is contrary to the requirements of 
U tab Code section 30-3-10.4. 
In Morkel's brief she appears to argue that Judge Taylor's temporary change from 
supervised to unsupervised visitation constitutes a "material change in circumstances" upon 
which the court could later base a ruling to permanently modify the custody award. Such logic 
is not only facially disingenuous but completely contrary to Utah law. The standard for the 
"material change in circumstances" comes from Utah Code section 30-3-10.4, which states 
that a petition to modify must show evidence "that the circumstances of the child or one or 
both parents or joint legal or physical custodians have materially and substantially changed 
since the entry of the order to be modified." Hence, the "material change in circumstances" 
must precede the filing of the petition to modify as it is the basis for the petition. Without such a 
change in circumstances, petitioner would have no good-faith basis for the petition in the first 
place. Therefore, for Merkel to claim that the temporary change from supervised to 
unsupervised visitation that was ordered at the very same hearing where Judge Taylor 
converted Morkel's Order to Show Cause to a Petition to Modify constituted the "material 
change in circumstance" that supported her Petition to Modify is both factually and legally 
impossible: it could not provide the basis for a pleading that did not exist and it could not 
provide the required evidence to support such a pleading when it was not in place prior to the 
4 
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creation of the pleading. 
D. Morkel's argument that the ability to substitute unpleaded "relief'' requires the 
court to be able to substitute an unpleaded "pleading" is unsupported by Utah 
law. 
Blocker does not dispute Morkel's argument regarding the court's ability to substitute 
unpleaded relief when necessary as she cites in her brief; however, this is quite different from 
allowing the court to substitute an unpleaded pleading. Such is not supported by Utah law and 
is contrary to principles of fairness as it takes the judge out of his role as impartial arbiter and 
into role as adviser for a party, especially when such party is represented by counsel. 
Principles of fundamental fairness would support permitting a judge either substituting 
or supplementing pleaded relief with additional relief that was not initially sought in a party's 
pleadings when that party is legally entitled to such relief but for whatever reason did not seek 
it and when without it the injured party would be left either unwhole or the other party would 
be left unduly benefited. This, however, is not the same as allowing the judge to interject his 
judgment regarding how the party should have strategically approached her case. 
If a party files the wrong pleading and is denied, the party can simply file the right 
pleading the next time-if the party has the required evidence to support the pleading 
standard for that motion etc. No fundamental fairness is lost by requiring the party to do so. 
On the other hand, allowing a judge to step into the shoes of the attorney and essentially "re-
plead" by converting one pleading into another type (especially when a substantial filing fee is 
waived in the process) at the very least taints the proceedings with a flavor of partiality. 
In this case nothing would have been lost if Judge Taylor had simply ruled on Morkel's 
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Order to Show Cause as she filed it. She later could have filed a Petition to Modify, if she 
chose to do so. 2 Morkel was represented by competent counsel who had filed the pleading 
that he and his client felt was appropriate for the matter they wanted to bring before the court. 
They supported her Order to Show Cause with the evidence they believed it warranted. They 
were not prepared for, nor did they have evidence to support, a Petition to Modify. By sua 
sponte converting Morkel's Order to Show Cause into a Petition to Modify,Judge Taylor gave 
her more than what she was legally entitled to; he stepped into the role of her legal counsel 
and stripped away the impartiality of the proceedings, and for that this Court should reverse 
his ruling. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the decision of the district court 
and reinstate Judge Davis's Custody Order and give direction to the district court that any 
modification to be made is only to substitute conditions for Morkel's unsupervised parent 
time that are consistent with the original order. In addition, Blocker requests that this Court 
award him the appropriate fees and costs associated with this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~ l~--
chaelBlocker 
Pro Se, Appellant 
DA TE: March 24, 2016 
2 It is relevant to note that on the record in court the very day Judge Taylor converted her Order to Show cause 
into a Petition to Modify Morkel stated that she was not seeking to modify the custody order. 
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